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CANADIAN IDENTITY: A FRANCOPHONE PERSPECTIVE

It would be imprudent to define Canadian national character as a collection of objective traits, as Andé Siegfried once attempted to do. National character or national identity is better understood in terms of the discourse of those concerned. How can we distinguish Canadians from Americans? How were the English Canadians of a former era distinguished from their French-Canadian contemporaries? How can we distinguish today's Canadian identity from Québécois identity if not by the images they have of themselves and by the distance they put between themselves and others?

National identity is above all a construct. In an uncompleted 1920 monograph on the nation, the well-known French sociologist Marcel Mauss expressed this idea well when he wrote that a "nation believes in its language." While at first glance the reader will no doubt be struck by the word *language*, it is actually the word *believes* that appears crucial here. With this word, Mauss indicates that identity is constituted first and foremost as a belief. He adds, "All the citizens who make up the nation participate in the idea that drives it." *The idea that drives it*: again, it is in the imagination, manifesting itself in works that reflect human thought, that identity is created.

Identities are formed through discourse. But what kind of discourse are we talking about? And how does a national identity come to be identified? Fernand Dumont has cast new light on these questions by identifying the processes through which a national reference is constructed. Dumont defines the nation as "a grouping by reference: people are brought together in a nation through common symbolism and ideological discourse. Historians, poets, and many others contribute to this symbolism and discourse, and hence to developing and confirming the reference." People share something in common, a symbolism of reference expressed in works of the collectivity such as literature, ideology, and historical writing. This shared symbolism is the basis for a sense of belonging that transcends divisions of class, religion, region, age, or sex, and that takes the form of national sentiment, which is not the same thing as nationalism. Consequently, there is a radical difference between Siegfried, whose approach to the definition of identity involves a view of society as an objective reality,

and Dumont, for whom society is what it interprets itself to be. We will follow Dumont's approach.

To analyse the contours of Canadian identity, we need to adopt a historical perspective so that we can trace the origins of the symbolism of reference. To bring the question of Canadian identity into focus, we need to start with the representations developed by groups of people who shaped the country and now share its common imaginative space. This space has been defined by aboriginal peoples, Acadians, French Canadians, English Canadians, Canadians living in various regions, and new Canadians who have come from all parts of the world.

Is the Canadian identity still a plural one, defined differently by people belonging to different groups? Is it fragmented, as Gilles Bourque and Jules Duchastel have characterized it? If there have been a variety of representations of Canadian identity through history, can it be said that there is now *one* genuine Canadian identity, an identity that can be thought of as a new totality as we enter the twenty-first century? As we will see, there are no easy answers to this question.

The Foreigner Within

Aboriginal peoples have lived here since time immemorial, but it is only gradually over the course of history that Canada has come to acknowledge their contributions. Despite the strong presence of the first inhabitants, Canadian identity was not initially defined as an aboriginal identity. Aboriginal peoples were not identified by name among the founding peoples of Canada. Instead, they were physically confined to reserves and consciously forgotten by history. The rewriting of history to accord them their place as founders is a task that has only recently been begun. The figure of the aboriginal has come to haunt the Canadian identity, just as in psychoanalysis the repressed once again comes to the surface.

Rémi Savard has offered what is probably the best characterization of the aboriginal identity with his description of the aboriginal as *l'étranger venu d'ici* – the foreigner within. This apt expression refers to two components of the process of constructing identity: lineage and relationship to others. Aboriginal people, the first inhabitants of Canada, are at the same time foreigners in their own land. They have lived on the margins of Canadian society, have had no real political power until recently, and are still wards of the federal state. In the course of the 1980s, however, they developed a greater capacity to act on their own behalf and acquired more bargaining power in relation to the federal and provincial governments. They are now exercising new power through which they are radically changing their collective identity.

Today, aboriginal peoples, overcoming the lack of self-respect and the tendency towards self-destruction that have marked much of their recent history, are affirming their identities with new pride. They do not have the same negative self-image as before, but in the non-aboriginal population social representations of aboriginal people have failed to keep pace, so that picturesque but outdated stereotype of the Indian still holds sway. As Denys Delâge has shown, the relationship between whites and Indians can be seen as a classic example of social representation of identity as the in-

verse of oneself, in which "one is the reversed mirror image of the other."

While aboriginal peoples can be divided into sub-groups and are fairly heterogeneous in terms of living conditions, they also have a common reference to a mythic traditional way of life. Initially based on a shared tradition and history and a common relationship with nature and with the Other, their collective identity now also relates to their objective situation as wards of the federal state living on reserves. This has given them a new shared feeling of being in a condition of dependency that, in turn, provides the motivation for their common desire to put an end to it.

The contribution of the aboriginal peoples to the construction of the identity of the first, non-aboriginal inhabitants of the country was considerable but, as Denys Delâge has shown, it has largely been unrecognized. The early Canadians borrowed a great deal from the culture and values of the aboriginal peoples. This contribution remains to be studied, but knowing that it exists is already a step forward that will need to be taken into account in future work.

From French Canada to Francophone Communities

The French presence in North America was the second basis for constructing the Canadian identity. The first French settlers called themselves *Canadiens*, with the explicit aim of distinguishing themselves from the people of metropolitan France. The earliest historical writers and explorers took pains to describe their customs, habits, and way of life that was already so different. This self-identification as *Canadiens* has ever since remained deeply rooted in the imagination of francophone Quebecers. Until the 1960s, older francophones continued to define themselves as *Canadiens*, by which they distinguished themselves from anglophones, whom they called *les Anglais*. Two constitutive aspects of identity appear clearly here: a definition of oneself and a reference to a significant other, an opposing figure.

Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, inhabitants of English or Celtic origin gradually appropriated the Canadian identity, leading the *Canadiens* to define themselves as French Canadians. After the failure of the union of Upper and Lower Canada, confederation in 1867 marked the emergence of two parallel identities, French-Canadian and English-Canadian. The "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state" that Lord Durham had described in 1838, and the two races that André Siegfried observed in 1912, were forced to redefine Canada together.

From the French-Canadian point of view, the Canada that was established at confederation was binational for about a century, roughly from 1867 to 1967. During this period, the British North America Act was defined as a compact between two nations, or two founding peoples. The 1867 constitution did not refer to a Canadian *nation*. Rather, it described the establishment of a federation recognizing some particularities of French Canada on the one hand and the British character of the rest of Canada on the other. Gordon Robertson clearly showed that the Fathers of Confederation were persuaded of the need to preserve two forms of diversity: regional diversity, and linguistic and cultural diversity.

The interpretation of confederation as a compact between two founding peoples was rejected by some Eng-

lish-Canadian historians, although it was accepted by numerous others. It was explicitly recognized in the Conservative Party's 1968 election platform under Robert Stanfield and the Blue Pages of the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the Laurendeau-Dunton Report), among other places. The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission's terms of reference also referred explicitly to the notion of "an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada ..."

The point here is not to choose one interpretation of history over another. Rather, what is important is that French Canada believed in the federation, or compact, thesis for generations. Holding this belief was a concrete way of marking its Canadian identity and indicating that it belonged to Canada as a collective entity, a national community that referred to a common symbolism. It was also a way of holding out a kind of utopia: a Canada that at its very origin formally recognized the founding contribution of the French.

In some ways, the two founding peoples lived in separate social realms. Even more, however, they lived in separate symbolic universes. Using analytic categories that were popular in the 1960s, French Canadians related to English Canadians as colonized to colonizers, as drawers of water for the English boss. To extract themselves from a situation of economic inferiority and colonial dependency, two models were presented to francophones. The quiet revolution of the early sixties was based on national affirmation supported by the Quebec state. Later, under Lester Pearson as prime minister and even more strongly under his successor Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Ottawa offered affirmation of the French fact throughout Canada. Thus, since the late 1960s, two opposing visions for promoting the French fact have been in conflict: national affirmation of a majority community in Quebec and affirmation of the individual rights of francophones living as minorities throughout Canada.

How has French Canada evolved? And in particular, how has the way it interprets itself changed over time? The traditional French-Canadian identity was based on ties of descent, lineage, and blood relationship. It was not restricted to a particular territory. Rather, it was expressed throughout Canada, in New England, and indeed in any place where French Canadians of the diaspora lived in the shadow of their parish church. This traditional French-Canadian identity has now disappeared and takes the form of a shattered identity.

It was shattered as a result of a fundamental contradiction that characterized French Canada. This contradiction was pointed out by Gilles Gagné, who showed that in the nineteenth-century traditional French Canada was deployed in two separate institutional spheres. The major national institutions that spanned French Canada from the Northwest Territories to Massachusetts, spilling over the borders of provinces and countries, were effectively controlled by the church. At the same time, an embryonic state and a modern democratic legislative apparatus emerged in Quebec, controlled by French Canadians but with no effective power over a major part of French Canada.

Several other factors contributed to the shattering of the traditional French-Canadian identity. Clearly the

most significant was the loss of influence by the Catholic Church. The church as an institution no longer organizes the daily life of French Canadians as effectively as it did in the past, and responsibility for schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions has been taken over by the welfare state. Nevertheless, the important role that the Catholic Church plays in the survival or maintenance of the French Canadian identity in anglophone environments can still be seen in a number of communities outside Quebec, such as in New England and western Canada.

Urbanization certainly helped to destroy most of the homogeneous rural environments in which francophones lived close to their parish churches. Saint-Boniface, which has become a suburb of Winnipeg, and the francophone villages built near Winnipeg are a good illustration of this process. In addition, industrialization resulted in francophones working in heavily anglophone environments. The education of young people, more often than not, takes place in bilingual institutions, especially at the secondary and university levels. And the media and cultural industries are powerful factors that not only impose the use of English but also help structure the collective imagination.

The end of the idea of French Canada can probably be dated to 1967, an important date in Canada's constitutional history. Several other landmark events took place in that year, including the publication of the first volume of the Laurendeau-Dunton Report, the provincial premiers' first constitutional conference, the rise of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the publication of his book on federalism, and the visit of President de Gaulle and his famous speech that brought the Quebec autonomy movement to worldwide attention. Finally, the Estates-General of French Canada that were held in Montreal inevitably highlighted the inevitable break between French Quebec and the French-Canadian communities scattered through the rest of Canada.

The distinction between the Acadian identity and the French-Canadian identity centred in Quebec dates back to the French regime. With the support of the New Brunswick government, Acadia has enjoyed a kind of second wind. The Acadians are a national community with a strong sense of belonging and common references, if only to the mythic memory of the deportation of their ancestors, now euphemistically referred to as *Le Grand Dérangement*, the Great Disturbance. Acadians have asserted themselves vigorously – in the education system, the arts, and literature as well as the economy – even though they remain a numerical minority. Their political power has increased and they hold a larger share of civil service positions in New Brunswick, where they are primarily concentrated. The legal recognition that comes from New Brunswick's adoption of official bilingualism has given the Acadian community new levers of development. In Acadia, the best-educated people are most likely to define themselves primarily as Acadians, highlighting their francophone identity. People with less education are more likely to define themselves as bilingual, thus giving English a place in their self-definition and minimizing the distinction between themselves and the anglophones, *les Anglais*. According to Annette Boudreau, defining oneself as *bilingual* means not having to choose between a French and an English identity.

Outside Quebec and Acadia, while the French-Canadian identity still has some of the features of a group identity, it is increasingly becoming an individual characteristic. Some will no doubt find this statement surprising, but there is evidence to support it. First of all, francophone communities outside Quebec and Acadia have little political control over the major institutions around which daily life and work are structured. In addition, the originator of the federal Official Languages Act, Pierre Trudeau, saw this legislation as being aimed primarily at guaranteeing access to services in French throughout Canada. In this respect it differs from Quebec's language laws, which aim to promote the collective interests of a national group.

Franco-Ontarians, Franco-Manitobans, Fransaskois, Franco-Albertans, and Franco-Ténois (francophones of the Northwest Territories) define themselves as belonging to their province or territory rather than to a mythic French Canada. They have a positive view of their bilingualism and see it as an advantage, despite the dangers of assimilation that go along with it. Here too, there are differences based on social class. The Toronto francophone elite has adopted multiculturalism, in effect opposing the Franco-Ontarian elite, which is more attached to a traditional vision of the French-language community.

Outside Quebec and Acadia, the entity francophones refer to when they say *we* is in danger of being reduced to an ethnic group. This drastic diagnosis can be mitigated: francophones outside Quebec and Acadia still see themselves as a national community, although they have lost the political significance they had at the time of Confederation and throughout the period when Canadian duality was a prevailing idea. Once English Canada became more reluctant to accept the idea of two founding nations, and once Quebec defined itself as a distinct society, French Canada clearly lost the means to assert itself as a political community and, for all practical purposes, fragmented into national minorities within each region. The very expression *French Canada* has aged rapidly in the last few years, to the point where it seems slightly anachronistic and outdated when one hears it in a speech or in conversation.

It is worth noting that the Franco-American identity has also been transformed. The Franco-American community has gradually moved away from French Canada, of which it used to be considered a natural extension. French Canadians living in the Little Canadas of the United States became Franco-Americans, and then Americans with French roots. From 1930 on, Franco-American historical writing has gradually abandoned its exclusive reference to French Canada and devoted more attention to France as the mother country, and thus to a mythic origin with more prestige than the impoverished French Canada of one's great-grandparents. The French language is disappearing in these communities, although there are a few places where it survives. What remains is the memory not of a national utopia but rather of an ethnic origin, one among many in the United States of America.

The Quebec National Identity

Gérard Bouchard has shown how in the nineteenth century the traditional French-Canadian elites created an identity sustained by false representations. The histori-

cal writing of the period sought to find Quebec's particularity in its being not a new society but the heir to a mythic past. The cultural world created by the elites was doomed by its lack of connection with popular culture. This gap between elite culture and popular culture became too wide to bridge, and it was popular culture that provided the quiet revolution with its major symbols. The nation as defined by its traditional elites no longer had the kind of meaning that could sustain a sense of belonging. The distance between cultural identity and national identity had become too great.

Francophone Quebecers do not define their identity as one of many ethnic identities in Canada. They conceive of it as a national identity based on the French language, which is imbued with great symbolic value. This is why language carries such heavy emotional baggage and why there is widespread agreement among francophones that French should be promoted in institutions and in public space. But is language the only basis for the Quebec identity? Is there a Quebec distinctiveness, as the Quebec government's 1978 white paper on cultural policy, *La politique québécoise du développement culturel*, argued? Or is Quebec culture an "imaginary territory," to borrow an expression from Michel Morin and Claude Bertrand. Christian Dufour shed new light on this question by showing how identity is defined by borders and based on political power, which is the only real guarantee of its maintenance and longevity.

The Quebec identity has been constructed on the basis of belonging to a territory contained within the borders of Quebec. Within that territory, it proposes to bring together newly arrived Quebecers of diverse ethnic origins with the existing core. The Quebec identity is now defined as a national identity. Quebecers now see language as a prime instrument for integrating people of various origins into a single entity and ensuring their participation in the host society. As the official language of Quebec, French signifies membership in a given civil society and is intended to be the rallying point for individuals living in that society. French plays a role in Quebec analogous to the role of English in the rest of Canada and the United States: language is not only an indicator of membership in a particular ethnic group but also the means of participating in a whole society.

Jean-Jacques Simard distinguishes official language from civil language. An official language is the common language of a society's citizens. It is the language new immigrants need to learn to be able to participate in the host society and the one that can be acted on by government policies, as can be seen not only in Canada but in the United States as well. A civil language, on the other hand, is a language of private life. Far from being the anxious reflex of a minority that cannot reproduce itself, Quebec's language laws are an expression of its desire to integrate new immigrants. Once integrated, these new immigrants will transform Quebec in turn. In fact, it can be argued that Quebec is trying to do what societies such as Canada, the United States, and France have done and continue to do – establish a common language.

Discussions of French-Canadian nationalism have frequently stressed its defensive character, related to its emphasis on the struggle for survival, idealization of the past, and resentment. Contemporary Quebec nationalism is different, however. As Michael Ignatieff has ar-

gued: "Quebec's nationalism is rapidly transforming itself from a nationalism of resentment into a nationalism of self-affirmation." In other words, Quebec nationalism has become a civic nationalism, and, distancing itself from ethnicity, it has begun to express a will to be, as Daniel Jacques puts it. Observers have not always clearly perceived this transformation of contemporary Quebec nationalism, which promotes Quebec as the nation-state of all the people who live in it. The confusion between ethnic and civic nationalism is still widespread in the work of Canadian intellectuals (such as Ramsay Cook, who maintains that the idea of the nation expressed by the Parti Québécois is still that of a homogeneous cultural community), as is the confusion between national feeling and nationalism.

It has to be acknowledged that Quebec's model of integration does not yet work perfectly. While new immigrants are learning French to a greater extent than those who came before the adoption of Bill 101 in 1978, English is still quite attractive, primarily because of the demands of the labour market and because the vast majority of immigrants are concentrated in the Montreal region, where bilingualism is most extensive. Because immigrants waver between French and English, they remain more attached to their mother tongue in Montreal than anywhere else in Canada.

But Quebec society also has a history: conquered and colonized, it belongs to Canada, representing a major component of Canada from any point of view. Hence, as all analysts have noted, it has an identity tugged between two poles of belonging. Jean Larose argues that "the Quebec nation finds itself between the dependence of the French Canadian and the independence of the Québécois." Jean Bouthillette has probably pinpointed this duality better than anyone else in a 1989 book with an evocative title, *Le Canadien français et son double* (The French Canadian and His Double). Elaborating on this theme, Gérard Bergeron has shown that, for more than twenty-five years, the sense of double belonging was incarnated in two opposing charismatic politicians: Pierre Elliott Trudeau and René Lévesque.

There is still a strong feeling of belonging and attachment to Canada in francophone Quebec. But this attachment is undoubtedly directed towards the real or imaginary Canada of André Laurendeau, a Canada that would allow Quebec a large measure of autonomy in pursuing its own affirmation. In that regard, the allegiance of francophone Quebecers is less to the Canada of 1982 than to the federal Canada of 1867, that is, to a Canada that accepted diversity – as defined by Donald Lenihan, Gordon Robertson, Roger Tassé, Jeremy Webber, James Tully, and Charles Taylor, to give only a few examples.

Finally, the continental character of the francophone Quebec identity needs to be highlighted. The Québécois may speak French, but they are also North Americans. This explains why the Quebec imagination is strongly attracted to, sometimes even fascinated by, the United States. This fascination was especially marked in the lower and working classes between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Such a phenomenon should not be confused, however, with Americanization. Rather, it indicates that the framework for Quebec culture is a new cultural space, which has replaced the traditional references.

From an English-Canadian to a Canadian Identity?

No less than francophone identities, the English-Canadian identity is undergoing profound change. Not only is it changing, it is also increasingly taking the form of a Canadian identity, with no qualifiers. Canada gives every indication of being in the process of constructing a new identity. For all practical purposes, the "one Canada" that John Diefenbaker dreamed of is a reality outside Quebec. In my view, a new and meaningful totality is being built in Canada from the English-Canadian root. Adoption of the constitution of 1982, which in a sense represented legal recognition of sociological transformations that had been taking place since the end of World War II, gave a powerful impetus to this process.

As Desmond Morton has suggested, a Canadian identity is more difficult to pin down than the Quebec identity. There is a melting pot at work in English Canada, he says, "but this melting pot is American and does not allow much opportunity for the definition of a Canadian identity as such." On the contrary, I would argue that a new construction of the Canadian identity is in process. To understand the shape of this identity, we need to go back to its origins, when two significant Others deeply affected the traditional English-Canadian identity: Americans and French Canadians. Over time, however, English Canada's relationship with these two significant Others has changed, and they are no longer necessarily perceived as threats.

The contrast between the principles that guided the people who drew up the British North America Act of 1867 and those that inspired the theoreticians of the American Revolution a century earlier has often been noted: Peace, Order, and Good Government on the one hand versus Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness on the other. The American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset evoked this contrast in the title of his 1990 book *Continental Divide*. More than two hundred years ago, he argued, the North American continent began to divide into two opposing entities: one made a revolution that was liberal, egalitarian, rebel, and whig; the other a counterrevolution that was conservative, authoritarian, Loyalist, and tory. The frontier was the paramount symbol of the American imagination, while the Canadian mind has been dominated for some two hundred years by survival and heritage. If Lipset's analysis is correct, Quebec and the rest of Canada have much more in common than is generally believed. As a complement to Lipset's argument, Desmond Morton emphasizes the loser mentality that characterizes the Canadian identity, noting "the recognition it gives to losers, from the Loyalists who were defeated in the American colonies and the *habitants* of New France conquered by England through the Irish immigrants escaping from famine to political refugees who have come in recent years."

In the twentieth century, governments have been more interventionist in Canada than in the United States, notably in the economic, social, and cultural spheres and especially since the advent of the welfare state. It was not long before Canadians came to value their social programs very highly, to the point where they now view these programs as a new mark of distinction differentiating Canadians from Americans. Canada has also been more interventionist in the cultural arena, with the establishment of national institutions such as CBC radio and television, the National Film Board, and

the Canada Council. These institutions have made a large contribution to shaping the image that English Canadians have of themselves, and, it should not be forgotten, they have performed a similar function for Québécois. Furthermore, Canada has been more interventionist in the economic field, supporting the development of a strong national economy through tariff barriers, to the long-standing irritation of the western provinces. Finally, it has been more interventionist in ensuring some sharing of wealth among the different regions of the country. The National Energy Program, adopted by Ottawa after the second oil shock of 1979, is a good example of intervention by the federal government in the name of a particular idea of what the country should be.

Three factors have substantially attenuated the traditional differences between Canada and the United States, while at the same time reshaping the Canadian identity: increased continental economic integration, immigration, and the development of a new political culture based on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Continentalism, which in the 1960s and 1970s was considered a complete negation of the Canadian identity, has made enormous strides. Its momentum is indicated by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, expanded by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to include Mexico, all in the new context of globalization. The large increase in north-south trade since the adoption of NAFTA indicates Canada's new level of integration into the North American economy.

At the same time, the Canadian economy is undergoing thorough change. The fiscal crisis that erupted in the 1990s forced the Canadian government to redefine its array of social programs. Large Canadian crown corporations (Air Canada, Petro-Canada, Canadian National) have been privatized and state capitalism is in retreat. Major public institutions such as the CBC and the research councils are facing serious financial constraints. Meanwhile, Canadian capitalism is expanding in the United States.

Do all these changes indicate that Canada and the United States are drawing closer together, and that as a result specific characteristics at the heart of the Canadian identity are being abandoned? Only time will allow a clear answer to this question, but the tendency is there. It should be noted, however, that even if English Canada is more integrated into the North American socioeconomic space, it is also showing considerable cultural dynamism – in literature, popular music, film, and painting. Through this cultural flowering, it is declaring its own identity, different from the American identity. If this analysis is correct, economic tendencies and cultural tendencies are evolving differently. In parallel to increasing economic integration, a new definition of Canada has emerged, based on the idea that drives it, which we referred to in the beginning of this entry.

Simultaneously, immigration is transforming not only the face of Canada but the very definition the country gives to itself. Canada is a land of immigration, and its largest city, Toronto, is now one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. In the 1960s an attempt was made to institute biculturalism, the dream of the French-Canadian elites. But biculturalism was quickly abandoned in favour of multiculturalism, which has become one of the primary markers of the Canadian identity.

Although multiculturalism has been perceived in Quebec as a policy whose effect is to trivialize Quebec's assertion of its own identity by treating the Québécois as one among many ethnic groups, it is also a policy suited to Canada's new face.

The rest of Canada does not share Quebec's interpretation: it sees multiculturalism as an original way of integrating immigrants and of distinguishing Canada from the United States. In this respect, Canada has adopted a very different approach from other countries of immigration. France chose a Jacobin model of integration that eradicates differences and emphasizes equality among all citizens. "Give me soldiers," said Napoleon, "and I will make Frenchmen of them." The United States has preferred a liberal model of integration of individuals, whatever their origin, language or culture, into the great American dream of a free society in which all individuals are responsible for themselves.

Multiculturalism is certainly an essential component of the new way in which Canadians define themselves. This official policy, however, also contains contradictions. First of all, it is difficult to build a common identity while promoting diversity. Indeed, it is with this fact in mind that the official Canadian policy of multiculturalism has been criticized in some circles, especially on grounds of closing cultural communities in by emphasizing their differences. Others see Canada's multiculturalism as a myth because in fact individuals integrate into the host society, which is primarily anglophone in culture.

This theme has been taken up by Reginald Bibby, who has argued that Canadian and American public discourse about immigration may be different but daily practice in the two countries is largely the same. The melting pot is at work in both societies and the challenges presented by the harmonious integration of diverse immigrant populations are in fact the same. The highly diverse origins of Canadians living outside Quebec and their integration into the anglophone majority constitute probably the most powerful force leading to a new self-definition in Canada. Canada received more than seven million new immigrants between 1951 and 1998, the equivalent of a country the size of Austria or Switzerland. Outside Quebec, these new Canadian citizens cannot identify themselves with English Canadians and simply define themselves as Canadians. A new totality, defining itself in an unqualified way as Canadian, is in the process of development.

This new totality represents a break with the bicultural and binational dream entertained by French-speaking Canadians in the early twentieth century. Its identity is expressed first and foremost in English. A new rhetoric of national identity emerged in Canada, as described by Ian Angus, and new symbols replaced British ones: a new flag, a new national anthem, the maple leaf. The fact that francophones outside Quebec now define themselves as bilingual Canadians rather than French Canadians is another element in this process.

Finally, in 1982 Canada gave itself a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has taken on enormous symbolic significance in Canadian culture. Probably more than any other factor, its reference to the rights of the person has changed the political culture of the country and contributed to the construction of a new identity, at the heart of which is an emphasis on individuals rather than collectivities. This is a major change. There are a number

of clauses in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that are directed towards the promotion of collective rights, but in practice individual rights have become an essential reference.

English Canada's relationship to the French fact has also changed substantially over the years. Although there are a number of reasons why English Canada has redefined itself with respect to this second significant Other, the following discussion will look at only two: language and institutional life.

There has been a clear trend towards language polarization in Canada. French is the mother tongue of 82 percent of the population of Quebec, while English is the mother tongue or the language normally spoken at home for 80 percent of the population in the nine other provinces. About 10 percent of Canadians outside Quebec say they are bilingual, as opposed to 35 percent in Quebec. Outside Quebec, there is a high rate of assimilation of francophones and of language transfer from French to English. According to Charles Cantonguay, there was a substantial increase in the cumulative rate of assimilation of francophones outside Quebec between 1971 and 1991: from 54 percent to 67 percent. Thus, Canada has become increasingly anglophone, while the proportion of Quebec's population that speaks French has remained above 80 percent. In practice, Canada outside Quebec appears as an anglophone country, with francophone minorities that acknowledge the preponderance of English as the primary reference point by defining themselves as bilingual. Quebec, meanwhile, has consolidated its own identity. Canada is indeed a bilingual country, but it is not a bicultural one.

A second reason for this increasing difference between English Canada and Quebec is the development of parallel institutions in the economic and social spheres as well as the cultural arena. This process can be illustrated by looking at an institution that has played a key role in the construction of the Canadian identity: the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). In practice, CBC television functions as two independent entities in two separate cultural universes. At the level of production there are few effective links between the English and French networks. Immigration provides another example of how Quebec and Canada have different approaches to the question of multiculturalism. Quebec has a policy of integration aimed at convergence, offering immigrants training in daily and civic life along with courses in language and civilization. Public discourse on immigration in Quebec is centred primarily on integration into the society where immigrants are settling and the need to build a common civic culture.

In short, a new Canadian identity – an unhyphenated identity expressing the idea of Canada as a new totality, with no need to attach an adjective (English or French) as a qualifier – is now emerging and probably being consolidated. While this new Canadian identity can be considered a successor to the English-Canadian identity, it represents a break with the country's history. Daniel Latouche, Guy Laforest, and other political analysts have shown that the contract agreed to in 1867 – the federal union established by the British North America Act – was unilaterally broken when the constitution was repatriated from London in 1982. "It was decided that the country could no longer allow itself to exist without being a nation," Latouche writes. The Constitution Act of 1982 established the basis of this new Canadian na-

tional framework, but, according to Kenneth McRoberts, it endorsed a misconception of Canada.

This new Canada also has adherents who promote it in Quebec, such as *Cité libre* magazine and Alliance Quebec. But a number of indicators, notably official positions taken by the Quebec Liberal Party until the late 1990s, suggest that not all francophone federalists share this new vision of Canada. This places Quebec federalists in a very uncomfortable position.

Let us conclude by proposing an answer to the question asked at the outset: how has a Canadian national identity come to be defined? There is a Canadian identity, a self-representation or an imagined community, to use Benedict Anderson's expression. Francophones outside Quebec have come to reconcile their own identity with this Canadian identity by defining themselves as bilingual. Not being of British stock, new immigrants who have settled in Canada could not define themselves as English Canadians. Instead, they have defined themselves simply as Canadians, and they have learned English to participate in the civic life of their new country. As of 1996 the premiers of the three prairie provinces were all citizens of non-British stock whose families were all relatively recent arrivals in Canada. Like an increasing number of their fellow citizens, they define themselves as Canadians. The same is true for the aboriginal peoples, who proudly declare their distinct cultural identity and seek more powers to develop their communities, but without calling into question their belonging to Canada. In short, Canadians have developed a strong national feeling that is expressed in their attachment to their great northern country and the symbols that represent it: the maple leaf, the beaver, the flag, the national anthem.

This leaves Quebec, most of whose French-speaking citizens, federalists and sovereigntists alike, have developed a strong national feeling of their own. This feeling, however, is not recognized in the new emerging Canada. The new Canada is reluctant to recognize Quebec's special place in confederation – as it did in 1867 – either by agreeing to a form of asymmetrical federalism or by accepting Quebec's demands, which have been expressed in a variety of formulas: special status, associate states, distinct society, sovereignty-association. The history of constitutional failure from the first constitutional conference in 1967 to the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the 1992 referendum indicates that this reluctance has become an insurmountable obstacle. It follows that the new Canadian identity and the Quebec identity coexist and are developing in parallel but different frames of reference.

SIMON LANGLOIS

CANADIENS. See CANADIAN IDENTITY: A FRANCOPHONE PERSPECTIVE; FRENCH CANADIANS

CANTONESE. See CHINESE

CAPE VERDEANS

Origins

Cape Verdeans originate from an archipelago known as